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Reform of choice of law rules for tort
Jack Wass, Stout Street Chambers and Maria Hook, University of
Otago, on the double actionability rule
INTRODUCTION
W
hen cases involve a cross-border dimension, choice
of law rules tell the court which body of substan-
tive law applies to determine the parties’ rights
and obligations. For example, if a New Zealand employee
contracted mesothelioma from exposure to asbestos in unsafe
workplaces in Malaysia and Belgium, what law should gov-
ern their claim in negligence against their employer? What if
they sue the Australian parent of their New Zealand employer
instead?
English law traditionally applied the ‘double action-
ability’ rule to tort claims. There is now a broad judicial and
academic consensus that the rule is outdated and no longer fit
for purpose. It has been abolished in the United Kingdom,
Australia and Canada.
We therefore welcome the introduction of the Private
International Law (Choice of Law in Tort) Bill (the Bill),
which Parliament referred to the Justice and Electoral Select
Committee at the end of 2016. The Bill proposes to abolish
the double actionability rule, instead requiring the court to
apply the law of the place where the events giving rise to the
claim occurred (the lex loci delicti), subject to a flexible
exception that enables the court to apply the law of another
country if it has a substantially closer relationship to the
parties and the dispute.
THE DOUBLE ACTIONABILITY RULE
The double actionability rule applies to torts committed
outside New Zealand. It has two elements:
(a) The plaintiff must establish both that the tort would
have been actionable in New Zealand if it had been
committed here and that the tort is actionable under
the law of the country in which it was committed. If
both elements are satisfied, the court nevertheless applies
New Zealand law to the substance of the claim.
(b) However, if one country has the most significant rela-
tionship with the occurrence and with the parties, the
substantive law of that country can be applied (to the
exclusion of the other law): Chaplin v Boys [1971] AC
356 (HL), Red Sea Insurance Co Ltd v Bouyges SA
[1995] 1 AC 190 (PC).
As originally developed in the nineteenth century, the rule
consisted of the first element only so that the law of the
forum would always govern the claim (Phillips v Eyre (1870)
LR 6 QB 1); that betrayed its genesis in a time when foreign
law was difficult to prove and English courts were suspicious
of foreign legal systems.
It has been generally assumed that the double action-
ability rule forms part of New Zealand law. No case has
squarely confronted the question of whether that is or should
be so (although Mahon J discussed the issue in an ex parte
context in Richards v McLean [1973] 1 NZLR 521 and
Potter J acknowledged the issue in Waterhouse v Contractors
Bonding Ltd [2012] NZHC 566). Since the rule has never
been considered by the appellate courts, it is arguable that the
High Court would be entitled to adopt a different rule even
without legislative intervention. Hopefully that will prove
unnecessary, except perhaps for cases arising out of events
prior to the enactment of the Bill. In the meantime, the rule
continues to occupy the courts, as demonstrated by the High
Court’s recent consideration of the relationship between
double actionability and the scope of the statutory bar in the
Accident Compensation Act 2001 (McGougan v DePuy
International Ltd (No 1) [2016] NZHC 2511, [2017] 2
NZLR 119).
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
There is no good reason to retain the double actionability
rule. Despite valiant judicial efforts to shape the doctrine into
an effective choice of law rule by the development of the
flexible exception, most notably by Lord Wilberforce in
Chaplin v Boys, it remains parochial, overly elaborate, diffi-
cult to articulate and as a consequence of its progressive
evolution enduringly uncertain.
While the United States had already developed its own
concept of the ‘proper law’ of the tort — most notably
through the Restatement (Second) of the Conflict of Laws in
1972 — it was not until the late twentieth century that
Commonwealth jurisdictions fully seized the nettle. Change
was brought about by judges in Canada (Tolofson v Jensen
[1994] 3 SCR 1022) and Australia (John Pfeiffer Pty Ltd v
Rogerson (2000) 203 CLR 503; Régie Nationale des Usines
Renault SA v Zhang (2003) 210 CLR 491) and by legislation
in the United Kingdom (the Private International Law (Mis-
cellaneous Provisions) Act 1995 (the UK Act)). Its abolition
by statute has been proposed in Singapore, but in the mean-
time the courts still apply the double actionability rule (Rick-
shaw Investments Ltd v Nicolai Baron von Uexkull [2007] 1
SLR 377 (CA)).
The real question is what rule should replace double
actionability. There are at least three alternatives:
(a) Apply the law of the place where the tort was commit-
ted (the lex loci delicti) without exception. This is the
rule adopted in Australia.
(b) Apply a general lex loci delicti rule, but displace that
rule where the case is substantially more closely con-
nected with another country. This is the approach
adopted in Canada and the United Kingdom and pro-
posed in Singapore.
(c) Apply the ‘proper law’ of the tort by asking which
jurisdiction has the ‘most significant relationship’ with
the case and the parties. This is the approach proposed
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in the Restatement (Second) of the Conflict of Laws,
and adapted in various ways in the jurisdictions of the
United States.
Special note should be made of the European approach.
Civilian legal systems have traditionally favoured the lex loci
delicti, but the Rome II Regulation that now governs choice
of law in tort across the European Union adopts as the basic
rule the law of the place where the damage occurred (the lex
loci damni) with various exceptions and special rules for
individual torts (Regulation (EC) No 864/2007, Recit-
als (15)–(19)).
The three alternatives are on a spectrum: the Australian
approach is predictable but rigid; the Canadian and English
approaches ameliorate that rigidity by allowing an excep-
tion, but only in rare cases; while the ‘proper law’ approach
gives the court the greatest scope to identify the most appro-
priate law to govern the case in light of the parties’ circum-
stances, but that flexibility means that the result in a given
case may be uncertain.
The English approach was settled after a comprehensive
law reform process, including two joint reports of the English
and Scottish Law Commissions (Working Paper No 87/
Consultative Memorandum No 62 (1984) and Report No 193/
Report No 129 (1990)). The UK Act applied from 1995 until
the Rome II Regulation came into force in 2009 (and contin-
ues to apply to cases falling outside the material scope of the
Regulation). The New Zealand Bill is modelled on the UK
Act, and with a few exceptions adopts its precise wording.
This was a wise choice. It should be noted that the Explana-
tory Note to the Bill suggests that the ‘presumptive choice of
law rule for tort is that the proper law applies’. That is
potentially misleading, since the Bill does not propose the
adoption of the ‘proper law of the tort’ approach as that
concept is generally understood, but the lex loci delicti.
THE BILL’S PROPOSED CHOICE OF LAW RULE
Clause 7 provides the general rule: the applicable law is that
of the jurisdiction in which the elements constituting the tort
occur. Where they occur in different jurisdictions, the appli-
cable law for property damage is the location of the property
when it was damaged, and otherwise the jurisdiction in
which the most significant element/s of the events constitut-
ing the tort occurred.
Clause 8 allows the court to displace the general rule
where it is substantially more appropriate for the law of
another jurisdiction to govern the claim, in light of the
significance of the factors connecting the tort with each
jurisdiction. Those factors include those relating to the par-
ties, the events constituting the tort, and the circumstances or
consequences of those events.
Although the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada all
apply the lex loci delicti, there is an important difference in
implementation between the jurisdictions. In Australia, for
example, courts must identify the ‘place of the tort’, and to
do so they ‘look back over the events constituting [the tort]
and ask, where in substance did this cause of action occur?’
(Distillers Co (Biochemicals) Ltd v Thompson [1971] AC
458). The High Court of Australia has acknowledged how
difficult that can be (Dow Jones & Co Inc v Gutnick (2002)
210 CLR 575 at [43]). In the case which inspired the fact
scenario described at the start of this article, a minority of the
Victorian Court of Appeal decided that the tort was commit-
ted where the employee was exposed to asbestos in the
overseas factories, a majority of the Court found that the tort
was committed in New Zealand where the employer was
based, and the High Court of Australia found that it was not
possible to make even a preliminary finding on the question
in advance of trial (Puttick v Tenon Ltd (2008) 238 CLR
265).
The Bill (following the UK Act) cuts through these diffi-
culties by asking where the events constituting the tort occurred.
Where those events occurred in different countries, the most
significant element or elements of the tort determine the
applicable law. For property damage, this is deemed to be the
country where the property was located when it was dam-
aged. Although this test still requires a value judgement, it
avoids the fiction that a tort is a unitary construct that occurs
in one place, where it is really an aggregation of acts, omis-
sions and consequences which may have occurred in differ-
ent countries.
The UK Act also provides, as a companion to the property
damage rule, a special rule for personal injury cases, likewise
focusing on the place where the victim was located when they
suffered the injury. The Bill omits this limb, presumably
because the statutory bar in s 317 of the Accident Compen-
sation Act 2001 severely curtails personal injury litigation in
New Zealand. But the statutory bar only applies where there
is cover, and even then it may be necessary for the court to
decide what law is applicable to a personal injury claim.
Although the courts would be free to achieve the same result
by the application of the general rule, we suggest that Parlia-
ment reinstate a personal injury rule to make the matter clear.
Clause 8 of the Bill allows the general rule to be displaced
where it is substantially more appropriate for the law of
another country to apply, taking into account the signifi-
cance of the factors connecting the tort with each jurisdic-
tion. This deliberately imposes a high threshold, and the
equivalent provision in the UK Act has been successfully
invoked on very few occasions (Lord Collins (gen ed) Dicey,
Morris and Collins on the Conflict of Laws (15 ed, 2012)
at [35–148]).
POLICY ISSUES
We now address some specific policy issues that have arisen
out of New Zealand and overseas experience.
Defamation
The UK Act controversially excluded claims in defamation,
which continue to be governed by the double actionability
rule. This ensures that English defendants may continue to
rely on defences available under English law (such as fair
comment or qualified privilege) that might not be available
under the law of the place of publication.
The Bill does not make special provision for defamation,
which will accordingly be treated like any other tort. In our
view that is appropriate: sustaining the double actionability
rule for this limited purpose would be perverse and ineffi-
cient. In principle a defendant who chooses to publish a
statement overseas ought to be prepared to answer for it
under the law of that jurisdiction, and the New Zealand
courts will retain their power to disapply any rules of foreign
law that conflict with public policy (see cl 9(3)(a) of the Bill).
Intellectual property
Particular difficulties have arisen with respect to breach of
intellectual property rights, including where the plaintiff
alleges infringement of a right created by another country’s
legislative intellectual property regime.
New Zealand Law Journal February 2017 25
Copyright of the New Zealand Law Journal  is the property of LexisNexis NZ Ltd and its content may not be copied, saved or emailed to multiple sites 
or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's written permission. However, users may print, download or email articles for individual use. 
 
 [2017] NZLJ 24
In Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer Entertainment v van
Veen HC Wellington CIV-2004-485-1520, 14 December 2006,
Sony sued Mr van Veen inter alia for breaches of the United
Kingdom and Hong Kong copyright legislation alleged to
have been committed in those countries.
The first question was whether the Moçambique rule
applied, which precludes the court from hearing claims involv-
ing questions of title to foreign immovable property (British
South Africa Co v Cia de Moçambique [1893] AC 602).
MacKenzie J found that the court could entertain a claim
where title was not disputed but breach was in issue. God-
dard and McLachlan have argued that the Moçambique rule
should be abolished entirely, leaving the matter to the court’s
power to decline jurisdiction where New Zealand is not the
appropriate forum (Private International Law: Litigating in
the Trans-Tasman Context and Beyond (NZLS, 2012) at 157).
Such reform should be comprehensive, and is beyond the
scope of the Bill.
The second question in Sony was whether the double
actionability rule barred the claim. MacKenzie J decided that
for the purpose of applying the first limb of the rule (whether
theactcomplainedofwouldhavebeenactionable inNewZealand
if it had been committed here), it was necessary to ‘effect a
notional transfer to New Zealand, for consideration under
New Zealand law, of both the infringing act, and the intel-
lectual property infringed’ (at [25]). Otherwise, an action for
infringement of foreign intellectual property could never be
prosecuted in New Zealand and separate proceedings might
be required in every jurisdiction. The abolition of the double
actionability rule renders such mental gymnastics unneces-
sary: the court can simply apply the law of the place where
the breach occurred, including the intellectual property regime
applicable in that country.
There remains the question whether special rules ought to
be included in the Bill to specify the law applicable to
defamation and breach of intellectual property rights (as for
damage to property). Proposed legislation in Singapore speci-
fies that the law applicable to infringement of intellectual
property is the law of the country where the infringement
occurred (Draft Torts (Choice of Law) Bill 2003, s 5(2)(c)).
Whether or not such a case would be caught by the general
property rule in cl 7(2)(b) of the New Zealand Bill, we
consider that the general choice of law rules in the Bill are
sufficient and it is not necessary to make specific provision
for defamation or breach of intellectual property.
Should the Bill exclude renvoi?
When the court is directed to apply the law of a foreign
country, does this include that country’s conflict of laws
rules? If so, those rules might direct the court back to
New Zealand law. This is the doctrine of renvoi. In Neilson v
Overseas Projects Corporation of Victoria Ltd (2005) 223
CLR 331, the High Court of Australia held that renvoi
applied to tort claims. The plaintiff had been injured in an
apartment provided by her husband’s employer in China.
The lex loci delicti rule directed the application of Chinese
law, but Chinese choice of law rules made an exception to
that rule where both parties were nationals of another coun-
try. A majority held that applying the ‘whole of the foreign
law’ resulted in the application of Australian law to the
substance: otherwise the Court risked applying Chinese law
when Chinese courts themselves would not have done so.
McHugh J dissented, arguing that it was logically impossible
to apply the whole of the foreign law, in particular because
that could include Chinese renvoi rules and result in infinite
regression.
Clause 5(3) of the Bill, following the UK Act, excludes
renvoi. The English and Scottish Law Commissions con-
cluded that the application of renvoi would create uncertain-
ties and would not meet the parties’ reasonable expectations
(1990, [3.56]). The debates in the High Court of Australia
about the difference between single and double renvoi and
the potential for infinite regression also demonstrate why the
inclusion of renvoi would cause more harm than good. As the
Law Commissions pointed out, the whole point of choice of
law rules is to identify the body of substantive law that the
New Zealand court considers should govern the claim; whether
or not a foreign court would choose that law is beside the
point.
Agreement as to the applicable law
It is well established in New Zealand law that parties can
choose the law to govern their contractual relationship. An
increasingly common feature of choice of law rules overseas
is that parties may agree to choose the law applicable to their
whole relationship, including tort claims (see, most rel-
evantly, art 14 of the Rome II Regulation). The Bill does not
expressly permit parties to choose the law applicable to tort
claims. This omission is consistent with the UK Act, and it is
in line with the Bill’s relatively modest purpose of abolishing
the double actionability rule. But the omission gives rise to
some uncertainty. In particular, it is unclear whether the Bill
would preclude a court from giving effect to such an agree-
ment at common law. If a New Zealand employer and an
employee based in Belgium had contracted that New Zealand
law should govern any dispute between them, including any
issues relating to tort, could the court give effect to the
parties’ intention despite the choice of law rules in cls 7 and
8?
On the current drafting of the Bill, the court could apply
the chosen law if there was already an established common
law rule that recognises the parties’ choice and takes prece-
dence over the double actionability rule (because cl 9(2)
confirms that the Bill is only intended to affect those issues
that are currently governed by double actionability). How-
ever, it isdoubtful that sucharulehascrystallised inNewZealand.
The court may still be able to give indirect effect to the
parties’ intention by relying on the flexible exception in cl 8
(see, for example, Kingspan Environmental Ltd v Borealis
A/S [2012] EWHC 1147). But it would strain the wording of
cl 8 — which requires ‘a comparison of the significance of the
factors’ connecting the tort with the affected jurisdictions —
to suggest that the chosen law would necessarily displace the
generally applicable law.
In light of the growing importance of the principle of
party autonomy in the conflict of laws, it would be short-
sighted to close the door to common law development in this
area. We suggest that Parliament clarify that the Bill is
confined to the realm of objective choice of law — that is, the
determination of the applicable law in the absence of agree-
ment — which will leave the courts free to develop rules
giving effect to choice of law agreements in appropriate
cases. ❒
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